#  <br> Data: Professional Sports and Mixed Strategies 

Game Theory Course:<br>Jackson, Leyton-Brown \& Shoham

## Mixed Strategies

- Some counter-intuitive features...
- Do people really play them?

Professional Soccer - Penalty Kicks

- Ignacio Palacios-Heurta (2003) "Professionals Play Minimax" Review of Economic Studies, Volume 70, pp 395-4I5
- I4I7 Penalty kicks from FIFA games: Spain, England, Italy...
- Ignacio considers left, center, or right choices, and considered which leg the kicker used; I will keep it down to left and right choices (his page 402) ignoring kicker's leg.


## Soccer Penalty Kicks

| Kicker/Goalie | Left | Right |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Left | $.58, .42$ | $.95, .05$ |
| Right | $.93, .07$ | $.70, .30$ |

## Pause the Video and Solve the Game

- The Goalie's probability of going Left $p_{G}$ versus Right $1-p_{G}$ must have the kicker indifferent
- The Kicker's probability of going Left $p_{K}$ versus Right $1-p_{K}$ must have the goalie indifferent


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- $p_{G} .58+\left(1-p_{G}\right) .95=.93 p_{G}+.7\left(1-p_{G}\right)$ or $.25\left(1-p_{G}\right)=.35 p_{G}$ or $p_{G}=5 / 12=.42$
- The Kicker's probability of going Left $p_{K}$ versus Right $1-p_{K}$ must have the goalie indifferent
- $p_{K} .42+\left(1-p_{K}\right) .07=.05 p_{K}+.3\left(1-p_{K}\right)$ or $.23\left(1-p_{K}\right)=.37 p_{K}$ or $p_{K}=23 / 60=.38$


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## Soccer Penalty Kicks - The Data

|  | Goalie <br> Left | Goalie <br> Right | Kicker <br> Left | Kicker <br> Right |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nash Freq. | .42 | .58 | .38 | .62 |
| Actual Freq. | .42 | .58 | .40 | .60 |

## Mixed Strategies

- Do players randomize well over time? Pretty well...
- How about under pressure? Do they become predictable? Statisticians/Game Theorists starting to keep them honest...
- Other sports: Tennis players and serves, M. Walker and J. Wooders, American Economic Review (2001) "Minimax Play and Wimbeldon" volume 91, pp 152I-I538.

Summary - Mixed Strategies - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Some games have mixed strategy equilibria
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- in society and business interactions: audits by tax authorities!

